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Life Insurance Firms in the Retirement Market:
1
Is the News All Bad?
January 1998
The role of the insurance industry in the retirement assets market is examined. The
popular image of the industry as one in decline is scrutinized by drawing upon various
governmental and industry data sources.
Our examination begins with the traditional area of corporate pensions, specifically,
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans. It is demonstrated that this segment has
remained relatively flat as proportion of wealth, but has declined in relation to the
retirement market as a whole. This slow relative change masks a dramatic shift away from
Defined Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans. The primary driver of this change is
the rapid growth of 401(k) plans.
The shift from large corporate plans to individual retirement planning is most strongly
demonstrated by the increase of IRA assets, such that they now comprise nearly a quarter
share of the market. This trend is surprising in light of the fact that contributions have
been low since a tightening of the tax code in 1986.
More germane to our examination is the annuities market. With 55 million contracts in
force, and total assets of $1.2 trillion, the insurance industry’s domination of this area would
seem to speak well of their present and future prospects. Indeed, annuities have grown as a
percentage of wealth, but within the retirement sector, they have been outpaced by other
instruments. This fact should be worrisome to insurance companies, as they have grown
increasingly dependent upon annuities as a proportion of premium income.
In summary, the picture for insurance companies is not as dire as the press has portrayed.
But, comfort should not be taken in this fact. Individual retirement planning is driving the
rapid growth of retirement assets. Annuities are, by and large, insurance companies’ sole
entry in this competition and, as of late, their record has not been exemplary. The low
loads associated with mutual funds and their flexibility set a difficult paradigm for
insurance companies to emulate.  But, a lack of a successful effort will relegate insurance
companies to the role of bit players in the retirement market.1
 I. The Popular Image:  The Dying Insurance Dragon
The popular view of the role of insurance companies in the private retirement
market is that of a dominant player that is rapidly fading in prominence. Mutual funds
are rightfully perceived as having attracted both the general investor, as well as those
planning for retirement. Banks are also seen as a threat, though to a much lesser degree.
Bank entry into the insurance market is much feared but thus far, greatly exaggerated.
While clearly a new competitor, the bank threat is merely one more piece of bad news,
one more combatant in the war for retirement assets.
In this paper we take a more objective look at the place of insurance companies
and their products in the retirement asset market. We survey the literature and available
data on the products that make up this growing segment of the financial landscape. Our
goal is to both understand the trends and identify opportunities.
The results are not all disheartening. The industry is clearly a central part of the
burgeoning retirement asset market, with a major share of the assets accumulated so far.
Its position over the last several years has been exaggerated and/or misrepresented by
snippets of data that have led to an incomplete picture of the retirement asset market and
the insurance industry’s role within it.
Specifically, a broad overview of the private retirement asset market suggests
that:
1)  The market itself is growing rapidly, as “baby-boomers” appear to be saving more
rapidly than the preceding generation.
2)  The retirement products used by this new generation have shifted substantially over
the past decade, such that
a)  pension assets are not growing as quickly as other forms of  retirement assets;2
b)  defined benefit plans are declining both as a percentage of wealth, and as a
percentage of retirement assets;
c)  corporate pensions are declining in favor of  individual retirement assets;
d)  annuities, offered by insurance firms, have grown in importance relative to
wealth and remained stable as a percentage of retirement assets.
3)  The observed growth in mutual fund market share has been primarily at the expense
of depository institutions, most notably in IRA and 401(k) assets.
This market overview suggests some clear requirements for the future growth and
profitability of insurance firms in the retirement market. The challenges are:
1)  to maintain dominance of the annuity market;
2)  to recognize that the defined benefit and defined contribution pension categories are
aged markets, subject to relative, if not absolute, decline;
3)  to compete effectively in the 401(k) and IRA segments of the retirement arena.
Make no mistake about it, however, the retirement market as a whole is growing
and as such is an extraordinarily attractive segment of the financial market. By yearend
1996, private retirement assets were nearly $5.1 trillion
1. Retirement assets have
increased their proportion of wealth from 10.6% in 1983 to 13.6% at yearend 1996, see
Figure 1. It is therefore possible, given the scenario of an increasing market, for an
industry segment to lose market share and yet increase sales and profits. Since 1990, this
has been the case for insurance firms. Prior to this date, even their market share was
increasing. Subsequently, however, their share has dramatically shifted as consumers
changed the asset categories selected.
Life insurance companies were never able to achieve a significant market share in
the fastest growing retirement asset markets, such as 401(k)s and IRAs. This lost share
can and should be viewed as a lost opportunity. Offsetting this loss is their annuity
market dominance. It has been projected, based upon historical trends and economic3
forecasts, that the market for individual annuities is expected to increase annually at an
8% rate
2. Therefore, it is wise to take some of the dire predictions with a grain of salt.
Many firms track the retirement asset market. The data supplied by these data
services and consultants are often the source for predictions of a collapse of the insurance
industry's share of the market. In the past, headlines such as, "Insurers Lose Ground to
Competitors in IRA Market,” or "Insurers Losing the Retirement Asset Battle," or, to
take a specific example, "Insurers Lose 401(k) Market Share to Mutual Funds
3," have
been commonplace. This last article was based upon data reporting that the insurance
company’s share of the 401(k) market slipped from 34% to 30% in the two-year period
from 1992 to 1994.  Mutual funds were declared victorious because they were able to
increase their share to 37% from 26%.
Industry pundits do make some important points. For example, well known
publications such as Best's Review
4 cite fundamental weaknesses that impair insurance
companies from competing effectively in the retirement asset market. Life insurance
products have been contrasted with those offered by mutual funds and are frequently
found wanting. Some of the citations are well worth repeating.
Most insurance companies offer a limited selection of investment choices. If
mutual funds are offered, insurers at times exhibit excessively conservative management
behavior, not unlike the pattern exhibited with their general funds. This has lead to
relatively poor investment results, or, at least, significantly less appreciation than
averages achieved elsewhere during the recent stock market boom. Returns from
insurance products are often further diminished by front or back-end fees, or deferred
sales charges that are generally higher than competitors. In aggregate, these factors4
predispose poor performance, and will lead the public to move  to other, better
performing institutions.
The traditional stronghold of life insurers, the annuity market, is not immune to
gloomy reports and projections. In thriving areas such as variable annuities, direct
insurance company sales are slipping. The Variable Annuity Research and Data Service
5
reports that direct sales of variable annuities decreased to 43% in 1995 and are projected
to further decline to 30% by the year 2000. Banks are identified as the primary culprit in
this sales decline. But, this market is the insurance industry’s to lose, they can do so
through passivity, or they can fight to keep the second largest segment of the market.
Through all of these assessments, we ask that the reader keep one caveat in mind,
data in the retirement market can be misleading and at times extremely opaque. Some
segments of the financial sector do not clearly report assets held for retirement in such
vehicles as 401(k) or IRA accounts. Others do not indicate the purpose for which
purchases are earmarked. For example, annuity figures are most certainly higher than we
and others report. Many annuities do not qualify  for tax advantaged status, therefore, are
not reported as being retirement assets. A further example is contained in the Pension and
Welfare Benefits Administration's report on defined benefit and defined contribution
plans; a total of $128.5 billion is reported as being held in insurance company general
accounts. A significant portion of this is most certainly earmarked for annuities.
6
Nonetheless, extrapolating from available data, with all its pitfalls, the bottom
line is that the insurance industry’s portion of the retirement asset market is huge. Life
insurance company assets and reserves of annuities alone have increased from $172.0
billion in 1980 to $1.315 trillion in 1996
7 (these totals include non tax advantaged5
annuities as is the practice of the Federal Reserve). These figures represented 2.06% of
1980 wealth and 3.52% of 1996 wealth respectively. Disregarding other institutions,
these figures reveal a relatively healthy insurance industry sector.
II. The Contest:  The Retirement Asset Market
Any discussion of the competitive position of insurers in the retirement asset
market must, of necessity, begin with an understanding of the market itself, and its
trends.  The retirement asset market consists of multi-year assets established to facilitate
the accumulation of wealth in anticipation of decumulation upon retirement. Such assets
are usually tax advantaged, with the tax liability of either, or both, principal and interest
deferred until withdrawal. Because of this feature, the category itself is imprecise, as
some may attempt to save for retirement beyond tax advantaged products, while others
may use the products’ tax advantaged status for multi-year non-retirement savings. It is
for this reason that the numbers produced by different reporting entities are often at odds,
and data problems represent a substantial challenge to any useful analysis of the market.
At its heart, however, the retirement asset market involves multi-year horizon
investment plans by whole generations of households. For these individuals, saving for
an event that will occur on the distant horizon requires discipline and foresight. Both
attributes have been examined in the popular and academic spheres. It is commonly
thought that the quantity of saving for retirement by the current U.S. population is
inadequate to ensure acceptable living standards at retirement. An OECD comparison
with savings rates in Canada, France, and Great Britain revealed that the U.S. has the
lowest savings rate and the highest percentage of its population entering the retirement6
portion of their life cycle.
8  While giving us a relative picture, this ranking begs the
question of what is adequate, and whether U.S. retirement asset accumulation is adequate
in light of this generation’s expectations and its existing government social programs.
A major hindrance to past research has been the lack of adequate data. The
situation has improved with the advent of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).
Beginning with Smith (1995)
9, evidence from this data series has begun to shift the view
about wealth adequacy, and offers evidence that wealth is being accumulated at a faster
pace than has been commonly thought. Mitchell and Moore’s (1997)
10 work adds further
evidence to the earlier study by the Congressional Budget Office (1993)
11 that used
cohort data in demonstrating that baby boomers are saving at a faster rate than their
parents did.
This is hopeful for the retirement asset market, but one should remember that in
all studies there is the problem of defining and measuring wealth. We have chosen to rely
on a relatively simple definition using only standard financial assets, including equity,
debt, cash, and short-term instruments. Some, including Gustman et al (1997)
12, have a
much more extensive definition of individual wealth, which includes such items as
housing equity and retirement wealth inclusive of social security and deducting
outstanding debt. Gustman et al (1997) find that households on the verge of retirement
have average total assets of $499,187 and median total assets of $339,725. These
numbers are $163,087 and $59,335 respectively, using our definition. The difference in
the mean and median statistics in both these  measures reflects  the upward skew
imparted by the holdings of the wealthy.7
Determining whether or not these resources are adequate for acceptable post-
retirement living standards is a difficult task and is investigated using many different
methods. However, in every case, the problem is compounded by the differing
percentage in post-retirement income needs demonstrated by different income levels
13.
The poor definitely need a higher fraction of pre-retirement earnings, known here as the
replacement rate. Generally, whatever examination tool is used, the conclusion reached is
that the current level of aggregate saving is inadequate for a clear majority of the general
public. In addition, future changes to the social security system which put the onus on
individual responsibility, will deepen the need for increased saving.
14
There is an extensive literature on governmental measures to remedy this
situation and their efficacy in stimulating saving.
15  Despite a great deal of contention, the
general view is that tax advantaged programs can induce greater saving, but not nearly at
the proportions desired. Samwick and Skinner (1996)
16 suggest that retirement accounts
which are rolled over should require that a minimum percentage be maintained. This
would decrease retirement asset slippage and may in fact be more effective than new tax
advantaged vehicles, though aggregate saving would not substantially increase.
The above notwithstanding, the new evidence on accelerating savings
accumulation is hopeful. This is true from a public policy point of view, as it reduces
concern for the numerous aging baby boomers, and implies substantial growth for those
portions of the financial sector offering retirement asset products. While evidence
suggests that not all financial products have experienced proportional growth, this broad
category of financial assets has been flourishing, and is likely to continue to do so.8
III. The Products:  Instruments of the Retirement Market
Not long ago, a listing of retirement assets would have been quite short. Pensions
offered by large firms made up the bulk of non government retirement assets, with most
individuals using standard depository institution deposits or retail mutual funds as
additional assets earmarked for retirement. However, the last half century has seen the
development of a number of tax advantaged, retirement specific asset categories which
now make up the bulk of retirement savings. To begin the discussion of the relative share
of these asset categories we will first review them.
A. Defined Benefit Plans
Defined benefit plans are provided by employers to their employees and promise
to pay a specified benefit upon vesting and subsequent retirement. Benefit payments
generally continue until the death of one or more of the covered persons, and as such,
these plans are a standard insurance product. To finance the liability, employer
contributions are determined actuarially. Funding by the employer is tax deductible, as
long as it is a qualified plan according to IRS regulations. Once enacted, employer
funding is inflexible, that is, proper levels must be maintained and the employees have
certain legal rights to coverage. Employer contributions are pooled and can vary over
time depending upon the investment performance of the pooled assets. However,
regardless of investment performance, the employer is legally liable for benefit payouts.
The firm therefore is the full bearer of risk.
From the point of view of the individual worker, this type of plan eases the
difficulty of retirement planning. Benefits are easily and accurately determined.
However, for the employer, the combination of the actuarial mortality risk, the vagaries9
of financial performance and high administration costs have made these programs
increasingly burdensome. These factors have figured prominently in the movement
toward defined contribution plans.
Under the defined benefit label, there are a number of different benefit plans with
varying methods of payout. A worker may accrue units- which are tied to his or her
compensation- or fixed dollar amounts. Other types of benefits may be tied to career
average salary, or some variation, and/or linked to years of service. Payouts are generally
in the form of an annuity.
B. Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans are employer sponsored plans that do not promise a
fixed benefit, but rather have benefits related to contributions and asset performance.
There are a wide variety of plans of this type, however, if contributions are within
specified limits, they are considered tax-sheltered and are therefore deductible by both
employee and employer. Generally, these plans are structured so that the firm contributes
a certain sum or salary percentage per covered worker, and has no additional rights or
responsibilities associated with these dedicated assets. Contributions tend to be related to
salary but do not ordinarily recognize past service.
Employers favor defined contribution plans because they are not generally liable
for asset performance and administration is less costly and complex. However, these are
some of the precise reasons why employees may find these plans less attractive than their
defined benefit counterparts. Determining expected asset levels at retirement is complex,
and administration time and cost is non-trivial to the employee.10
With defined contribution plans, employees can determine, indeed they are
responsible for, asset selection, risk-return trade-offs and their own retirement planning.
On a positive note, the compounding of interest and/or dividends can lead to large sums
at retirement, but generally require long accumulation periods. However, poor asset
performance can lead to inadequate retirement funds, a fact that may be lost on this
generation that has never seen a bear market.
The types of defined contribution plans are quite varied and a dedicated pensions
text should be consulted for full and detailed information
17. A sampling of the form that
defined contribution plans can take include the following:
-Profit-Sharing Plans whereby the employer payments are tied to corporate
profits (within limits).In such cases, there must be a definite allocation plan and
payouts are tied to account balances.
-Employee Stock Purchase Plans where shares of the employer are purchased, 
often with the employer matching a portion of the purchase price. In many cases, 
other equities  may be purchased but at least 50% must be in employer stock.
-Thrift Plans in which the employee contributes a fixed percentage of their salary.
There may be some degree of employer matching. The employee is often offered
a choice as to how funds are invested. Funds are segregated into separate accounts
and interest and dividends are reinvested.
-401(k) Plans in which payments are tied to firm profits. This is the newest and
fastest growing portion of this category. But, in reality, it is a variation of profit-
sharing plans. Contributions are considered to be salary reductions and may be
matched by the employer. Assets accumulate tax free until withdrawal.
-403(b) Plans are the counterpart of 401(k) plans for nonprofit organizations. 
While not properly described as a profit sharing plan, salary reduction and 11
employer contributions mirror their private sector counterparts. In fact, for data 
purposes, these are often aggregated into the private sector 401(k) totals.
C. Individual Retirement Accounts
Beyond employer sponsored retirement plans, individuals have access to tax
favored investment through individual retirement accounts, known as IRAs. Once
extremely popular, they have fallen out of favor with a tightening of the tax code in
1986. Contributions are deducted from earned income and can be up to $2,000 (or total
compensation, whichever is lower) for individuals and $4,000 for married couples.
However, if the employee participates in another qualified plan, the limit declines
to zero in the $25,000 to $35,000 income band. Beyond this income level, contributions
are no longer tax deductible
18. An employer may contribute funds but these are
considered to be compensation and taxed as standard earned income in the year in which
it is paid. However, tax on all interest and dividends is deferred until withdrawal.
Funds are transferable to other providers of IRA services, but withdrawals are
restricted. Assets can be invested in a wide range of investment choices including fixed-
term savings accounts, certificates of deposit, annuities, mutual funds, and self-directed
brokerage accounts to name a few possibilities. As is the case with all defined
contribution programs, however, the benefits of these investment decisions accrue to the
program recipient, for better or worse.
Recently, IRA accounts have also been used for at least two other purposes. The
first of these is a lump sum transfer from a defined contribution plan, associated with
early termination or an early withdrawal from the tax-sheltered plan. In such cases the
employee may establish an IRA with the transferred assets and maintain their tax status.12
The second area that has seen recent growth is the use of simplified employee
pension plans or SEPs. This program is aimed at small employers with less than 25
employees (there has been discussion about increasing this number). Administrative
paperwork is kept to a minimum by the adoption of one of two model plan documents.
Contributions are essentially salary reductions and are tax deductible by both employee
and employer. This retirement class has been termed “super IRAs” because of their much
higher limits. The employer may contribute 15% of annual compensation or $30,000,
whichever is less. The employee may contribute up to $7,000 annually. SEP creation
requires a SEP-linked IRA account into which funds are transferred in standard defined
contribution fashion. The point here is that the IRA market has experienced some of its
growth because of its ability to participate in the rapid expansion of the defined
contribution market discussed above.
D. Annuities
We single out this investment type because of the sheer size of its investment
market, as we shall see below. Generally speaking, an annuity can be many things.
Annuities can be both a method of payout, and an investment vehicle in itself. Annuities
may begin paying benefits immediately, or payments can be deferred to some future date
as, for example, expected retirement. Annuities may be purchased by a single lump sum
payment, or through a series of payments over a number of years.
There are also different types of annuities depending upon contract terms over the
accumulation phase. In some cases, the annuity declares a return each period based upon
market performance. In other cases, the return is specified for a pre-determined period of
months or years. Guaranteed Investment Contracts (GICs) offer a guaranteed interest rate13
for a specified period. With a multiple guarantee contract, multiple payments are made,
each with its own interest rate. This market is large, but has been waning in recent years.
Recently, there has been a growing popularity of variable annuities. In these
products, accretion of funds may be tied to an index, such as insurance company general
fund returns, the Consumer Price Index or some other index. It may also be directly
related to the performance of the segregated assets invested on behalf of the annuity. The
holder is often given latitude as to how funds are invested and granted permission to
transfer funds to other portions of the financial market.
The variation in the types of annuities makes it difficult to talk about the market
in simple terms. However, its flexibility is one of its major benefits. Annuity contracts
can be structured for pre or post tax dollars, fixed or variable terms, and fixed or variable
returns. In all cases, however, these contracts include tax advantages for interest and
dividends, and actuarial risk of some type. The latter has developed into both an attribute
and Achilles’ heel, as we shall discuss below.
IV. Recent Trends:  The Dynamics of the Product Markets
The retirement asset market, as of late, has experienced rapid change. On an
aggregate level, retirement assets have been growing more rapidly than either overall
economic activity, or aggregate financial wealth. However, the real story is the changing
shares within the market. To see this, we begin by reviewing the dynamics of individual
product markets, and then move to institutional market shares. Given the nature of the
data available, the breakdowns may be somewhat different, but always are the most
descriptive available.14
A. Pension Assets
As noted above, the term “pension” was at one time synonymous with a corporate
pension plan which was provided solely by a worker's employer. This category was
divided between defined benefit (DB) plans, where contributions are variable and the
benefits are fixed, and defined contribution, (DC) plans, where contributions are fixed
and benefits variable. It is on the defined contribution side where the picture can be a
little opaque. In many cases the employee is able to contribute with the corporation
matching these contributions to some degree. This employee aspect has become
increasingly important in recent years. Therefore, it has become difficult to divide the
retirement market strictly into employer and employee sectors. We will proceed with this
in mind.
Over the period from 1980 to 1993
19 the combined assets of both DB and DC
plans grew from $563.6 billion to $2.3 trillion; see Figure 2. Insurance company totals -
which are usually reported separately - increase the total to $3.1 trillion. With inflation
and wealth increasing over this period, these figures do not convey much more than that
the retirement market has grown precipitously. The combined market benchmarked
against total wealth has fluctuated in the 10.62% to 13.62% range over the period 1983
to 1996. The general trend has been upward with the single exception of the period 1985
to 1988.
However, the decidedly upward drift conceals a dynamic shift in the makeup of
this sector. As Figure 3 illustrates, the market has demonstrated a strong shift away from
defined benefit plans toward defined contribution plans. In 1980, defined benefit assets
were 2.5 times that of defined contribution assets. By 1993, the last date available,15
defined benefit assets were only 1.17 times that of defined contribution plans. The trends
indicate that the two plans are likely nearly at parity at the present time.
The rise of individual saving for retirement, through such vehicles as 401(k)
accounts, further alters the analysis. Gross defined contribution figures include 401(k)
balances in the totals. If one deducts 401(k) assets, we arrive at the data reported in
Figure 4. This reveals that the percentage of wealth represented by other defined
contribution plans has declined slightly over the period. More importantly, it is apparent
that the total employer-related portion of the retirement assets market is declining.
Defined benefit programs have been declining precipitously from 5.41% to 4.41% of
total wealth over the reported decade, as DC plans have drifted only slightly lower.
Evidence offered elsewhere by Papke (1996)
20 illustrates that DC programs have
substantially replaced DB plans within the corporate pension fund market over this
period. This is true even while their total is declining as a percentage of wealth. This
result is hidden by the dramatic increase in 401(k) assets, but is evident in Figure 4. To
investigate more thoroughly, let us examine this market more closely.
B. 401(k)  Accounts
Legislative action lead to the creation of 401(k) accounts in 1978. However, this
retirement program did not become popular as a savings vehicle until its operation was
clearly defined by the Treasury Department in 1981. At that time, the requirements of the
market were set forth. As noted above, the availability of 401(k) accounts is dependent
upon employer sponsorship, but it is essentially an individual’s account. Because the
employer may match a portion of the employee’s contribution, 401(k)s are listed as16
defined contribution plans. However, the employee’s choice of contribution level, and
how funds are invested, has led many to consider 401(k)s as being individual accounts.
Contributions to 401(k) accounts began at modest levels in comparison to both
DB plans and IRAs. Contributions in 1984 were $16.29 billion, but nearly doubled in the
next two years. However, unlike IRAs discussed below, 401(k)s were not materially
affected by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Therefore, contributions continued to increase
each year over the last decade. Annual contributions in 1993 were $69.3 billion, well
beyond the peak levels of IRA contributions as reported in Figure 5.
Total 401(k) assets continue to rise both absolutely and relatively. The period
from 1984 to 1993 saw total assets increase from $91.8 billion to $616.3 billion. These
gross dollar amounts correspond to 0.74 % and 2.18 % of total wealth respectively.
While the current value of outstanding 401(k) assets is lower than its IRA counterpart,
this can be attributed to a smaller time frame for contributions; see Figure 6.
C. Individual Retirement Accounts
Many view individual retirement accounts as beginning with the Tax Act of 1981.
However, IRA contributions were $1.4 billion as early as 1975. But, with the Tax Act of
1981, IRA saving became tax advantaged, thereby becoming particularly attractive. At
this point contributions rose from $4.8 billion in 1981 to $28.3 billion in 1982.
Contributions increased rapidly until their  peak of $38.2 billion in 1985. Subsequently,
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the code once again, this time to the IRA’s
disadvantage. Savers responded by reducing contributions to levels only slightly higher
than were seen prior to 1981. Figure 5 illustrates the sensitivity of IRA annual17
contributions to the tax code changes. Notice how annual contributions declined
immediately following the legislation.
The importance of individual retirement accounts is perhaps better seen by
looking at total assets. In 1983, total IRA assets were $91.3 billion. By yearend 1996,
total assets had swelled to $1.35 trillion. To put these figures into perspective we have
normalized them by wealth in Figure 6. The 1984 figure represents 1.06% and the 1993
total represents 3.07% of wealth. So, despite flat contributions since 1987, total assets
have dramatically increased. To be sure, much of the growth is a result of the gains in the
equity market over this period, but nevertheless a large and vibrant asset pool is
demonstrated.
The combination of large outstanding balances, transfers from other retirement
asset accounts, and the rise of SEP programs (which comprised 5% of 1995 IRA assets
invested in mutual funds
21) make this an attractive market. As such, competition for the
$1.3 trillion aggregate total is fierce. Within this category, rollovers and small business
SEP programs are a more important active battleground than are new IRA accounts.
However, the lack of data does not permit  a detailed analysis.
D. The Annuities Market
Group annuities come in many shapes and sizes, but are usually purchased by
employers on behalf of their employees. Group and individual annuities can be
components of either defined benefit or defined contribution plans. Variable annuities
differ in that their funds are usually invested in equity. They are sometimes classified as
defined contribution, and can also be either group or individual.18
But, by any measure, the annuity market has grown increasingly active in recent
years. Sales of group and individual annuities (including taxable) were $19.45 and
$15.20 billion respectively in  1982. By 1996, these figures had risen to $92.23 and
$84.07 billion respectively. However, these figures disguise the fact that group annuity
contributions have traditionally been greater than those of individual annuities. In 1986,
they were more than double. The differential peaked during the period 1986-1990; see
Figure 7.
On the other hand, contributions to individual annuities have risen steadily
through 1995. By 1994, individual annuity contributions had overtaken group
contributions, with a slight backing off in 1995 and 1996. A similar pattern of growth is
shown in Figure 8, where annuity premiums are scaled by total wealth. Growth is
obvious, with the largest relative gains over the last decade accruing to the individual
annuity market.
Shifting from premium income to numbers of contracts, Figures 9 and 10 show
the growth in the number of people holding fixed and variable annuities. Noticing the
differential scale, it is obvious that the fixed annuity market still dominates, but the
recent dramatic growth of both individual and group annuities is startling. In fact,
recently reported data suggests that there are over 47 million annuity contracts in force.
22
Turning to assets held in connection with the annuities in force, Figure 11 reports
on assets and reserves of annuity contracts and shows a similar dynamic. 1980 assets and
reserves were $140.42 billion and $31.54 billion for group and individual annuities
respectively, while the 1996 totals were $657.06 billion and $658.35 billion (these totals
include non tax advantaged annuities). Normalized as a percentage of wealth, the 198019
figures were 1.68% and 0.38% respectively. These figures have risen steadily to 1.76%
in 1996. Group annuity assets and reserves peaked in 1990 at 2.32%. On the other hand,
individual annuities have steadily increased to their current levels at yearend 1996 (the
data from 1996 isn’t directly comparable to previous years due an accounting change).
As Figure 10 illustrates, the growth in the market has been particularly
spectacular in the variable annuity sector. Several factors account for this recent growth:
1)  the relative decline in defined benefit plans;
2)  the increased interest by the more affluent and educated baby boomer cohort,
3)  the increased acceptance of equity investment for asset accumulation.
This latter point may be particularly relevant. Returns on variable annuities
devoted to equity investment tend to be higher than traditional annuities because of their
similarity (in spirit, if not in fact) to equity mutual funds. While the rate of inflow of
funds to mutual funds has been quite rapid for over a decade, the rise in variable
annuities has been even more so. Contributions have increased fourfold since 1991,
rising from $17.3 billion in 1991 to $73.8 billion in 1996.
The shift to variable annuities is further demonstrated by viewing their increased
share of annual premium income. In 1983 only 9.85% of premiums were for variable
annuities, by 1996 the share had risen to 31.54%. While this total is still substantially
below the fixed annuity counterpart, see Figure 12, the relative growth is noteworthy.
V. Market Shares:  The Changing Fortunes in Retirement Products
With the changing nature of the retirement market, it is obvious that the product
mix is dramatically changing. Defined benefit plans are giving way to defined
contribution plans, 401(k)s, IRAs and annuities. The battlefield of future competition is20
going to be in these four product areas, as the defined benefit market is aged and in
decline. This has several implications for the astute observer.
First, institutions that have a large part of the defined benefit market will
inevitably lose their relative position in the broader retirement asset market. This means
that insurance firms and bank trust departments that have traditionally been strong in this
market will find it virtually impossible to maintain their relative position.
Second, the changing product mix implies that the future growth of these firms
will depend upon their ability to garner market share in the four growth areas enumerated
above. Further, with the move toward individual pension planning, the real contest will
center around the control of the retail market. In short, the future depends upon
maintaining, acquiring and/or growing assets in the IRA, 401(k), and annuity  product
areas. Let’s look at recent trends in each of these areas.
A. Individual Retirement Accounts
During the period from 1984 to 1993, IRA assets have risen impressively from
9.93% to 23.41% of total pension assets (Figure 13). As was mentioned previously, this
is in spite of the fact that direct contributions have fallen considerably since their peak in
1985. The increase in total assets can be attributed to appreciation in asset value, lump
sum rollovers, and the expanded use of IRA accounts in the nascent SEP market.
The four main institutional players in the IRA market are: depository institutions
(commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions), investment brokerage firms, mutual fund
complexes, and insurance companies. Figure 14 demonstrates the dramatic changes in
relative share experienced by these institutions in the last eleven years. Mutual funds and
brokerages have made sizable inroads into depository institutions’ share. Depository21
institutional share has declined from 61% in 1985 to 18.4% in 1996. Mutual funds and
brokerages have picked up 43.2% of this drop; mutual funds increasing from 15.8% to
37.9% and brokerages from 14.7% to 35.8%. Part of this change is explained by the
appreciation of equities. At the same time insurance companies have exhibited a
pronounced decline from a 10.4% market share in 1990 to 7.8% in 1996.
With contributions at a low point, competition for lump sum rollovers will likely
heat up in coming years. The Employee Benefit Research Institute looked at the IRA
contributions market during the period from 1987 to 1990
23. During this period, for every
newly initiated rollover account, contributions continued in 3.85 existing accounts. The
pattern is reversed if we look at dollar amounts. A typical rollover account has an annual
contribution which is 3.21 times that of a regular account. Of course this figure is
statistically misleading since it incorporates the large initial amount which is rolled over.
Both the number of accounts and the dollar amounts were moving in favor of rollover
accounts during this period. The ratio of existing accounts to rollover accounts decreased
from 4.92:1 in 1987 to 3:1 in 1990. The dollar ratio of rollovers to regular contributions
increased from $ 1.99:1 to $ 4.58:1. IRA rollovers which are invested in the mutual fund
market show a similar trend. The share of rollover assets increased from 27.39% to
34.17% of total IRA assets over the period extending from 1992 to 1994
24.
As noted above, IRA contribution rates are sensitive to changes in the tax code.
At present, the majority of fee income is derived from management of the existing huge
asset pool. Changes in relative institutional share will likely be dependent upon making
inroads into the rollover market, and the new SEP-IRA and Roth IRA markets. However,
the data suggest that depositories are clearly losing share to mutual fund complexes and22
brokerage firms. Insurance firms can only gain market share here by being more
aggressive in the rollover competition. This implies a need to be more responsive to the
desires of retail customers to participate in equity ownership, as fixed rate asset choices
seem to be losing market share to equity participation across the board.
B. 401(K) Accounts
This segment of the retirement market is currently slightly over 70% of the size
of IRA balances. As of yearend 1993, the most recent date available, total assets were
$616.3 billion. With the downturn in IRA contributions, 401(k) accounts have rapidly
taken up the slack. As noted above, annual contributions have risen uninterrupted from
1984 to 1993. Unlike IRAs, both contributions and asset levels have increased rapidly.
This has lead to an increasing share of the total assets of the pension market. In 1984,
401(k) accounts represented only 6.91% of total retirement assets. By 1993, their share
had risen to 16.63%. This is revealed in Figure 13 using Department of Labor figures.
Data on the institutional makeup of the 401(k) market is sparse. The mutual fund
industry is the only industry that regularly reports its market share. During the period
from 1986 to 1995, mutual funds have seen their 401(k) share rise from 8.39% to
38.67%. See Figure 15. The rapid growth in the 401(k) market provides opportunities for
both new accounts and maintenance of outstanding accounts for all segments of the
financial sector. As with IRAs, rollovers are another avenue by which to make market
inroads. However, success of the insurance industry depends upon its ability  to offer
products which permit equity participation, and offer a wide range of investment options.
Depository institutions have been losing market share here because they have not offered23
their customers a wide range of choices. The insurance industry cannot afford to make
the same mistake.
C. Annuities
Annuities represent the second largest segment of the retirement market. In the
last year in which aggregate totals are available, 1993, annuities held 19.81% of the
market (IRAs were first with 23.41% and 401(k)s followed with 16.63%), see Figure 13.
As would be expected, insurance companies are dominant in this area. Their share of the
distribution market for annuities in 1993 was 75.91%. In raw dollar amounts, annuity
reserves totaled $1.041 trillion, of which insurance companies classified $733.93 billion
as being retirement targeted. It must be kept in mind that these figures understate
retirement annuity totals. Many individuals make purchases of annuities which do not
qualify for tax deferred status. Nonetheless, Figure 16 reveals that tax deferred insurance
company annuities’ share of total retirement assets have declined over the current decade.
Their market share has slipped from 20.38% in 1983 to 16.61% in 1996, having peaked
in 1990 at 22.56%. The picture is somewhat better if we follow the Federal Reserve's
practice of including non tax advantaged annuities. Insurance annuities would then start
with a market share of 24.17% in 1983, rise to 30.26% in 1990, and decline to 25.89% in
1996. Using these totals, annuities displace IRAs as the largest retirement asset
instrument.
Annuities are sold through many avenues in addition to direct sales by insurance
companies. Banks are a new and increasingly important distribution channel. An
ominous note for insurance companies is that their share of initial sales fees may be
declining. Their share of revenue in the increasingly popular area of variable annuities24
was 55% in 1994 and decreased to 43% in 1995. It is projected by some to drop to 30 %
by the year 2000
25. This trend could be compounded by the announced intention of banks
to create and market their own annuities, as opposed to merely selling those of insurance
companies.
26
VI. Looking Ahead:  The Future of the Insurance Industry
At $5.1 trillion in assets and reserves, the private retirement market is massive. It
is growing both absolutely and relatively. Millions of workers are dependent upon it for
their livelihood. Millions more are dependent upon it for their future.
Much has been written about insurance companies’ slipping competitiveness in
the retirement asset market. While not as severe as portrayed in the popular press, their
share has been decreasing. Overall, from 1983 to 1996 insurance company share slipped
from 22.74% to 18.03%; see Figure 17. This long term trend has accelerated in the last
six years with a decline of 8.35% from their peak in 1990. Insurance companies should
be troubled by the recent greater than one percent decline per year.
In their traditional stronghold of annuities, insurers remain preeminent. The
numbers of annuity holders, reported in Figure 18, demonstrates this. Many investment
firms and banks have proclaimed their intention to challenge the insurance industry in
this area, but have yet to do so with much visible success. Of greater relevance is the
industry’s own need to maintain effectiveness and cost efficiency in its delivery systems
to remain competitive. In areas such as variable annuities, they are under increasing
attack by mutual fund houses that wish to gain market share at the expense of an
insurance industry that, at times, fails to take advantage of its market leadership.25
The similarity of variable annuities to mutual funds has been a major reason for
their success. But herein may lie the problem. Variable annuities tend to have higher fees
than traditional mutual funds.
27  As we know, part of these fees go to options such as life
insurance attachments and principal protection. But, as with load mutual funds, these fees
will hurt long-term performance. Performance may be further affected by low risk
portfolio choices. As consumers become more savvy, these inhibitors may nullify the
value of insurance attachments and variable annuities may subsequently lose their luster.
In fact, the success of insurance annuities is somewhat problematic. Annuity
premium income has eclipsed traditional sources of income such as life and health
insurance; see Figure 19. We have seen a fundamental shift to a dependence on the
retirement market. It is for this reason that insurance companies should be particularly
wary of encroachment upon their annuity share.
As far as the industry’s potential in other areas, the picture is decidedly mixed.
They have slipped from their IRA market share peak in 1990 of 10.8% to 7.8% at
yearend 1996. However, at the same time, IRA assets’ proportion of insurance company
pension assets has increased from 3.34% in 1983 to 12.04% in 1996; see Figure 20.
Therefore, despite losing market share, IRAs have become increasingly important to
insurance companies’ earnings and asset growth. They cannot afford to passively lose
this market to the mutual fund industry, as depositories have done. They must compete
with a wider array of products and at a competitive fee structure. Otherwise, their share
will follow that of banks and thrifts in the last decade.
Finally, the explosion in the 401(k) market should be a signal to all players in the
retirement market that complacency can lead to missed opportunity. This area, as with26
that of IRAs, is marked by rapid account turnover. The rollover market is many times
larger than that of account initiation.
28  Perhaps this is the method whereby insurance
companies can win back market share from mutual funds. It is a market clearly too big to
ignore, and a key competitive opportunity. It remains to be seen if it is  up to the
challenge.
Overall, insurance companies have slipped in their share of the retirement assets
market over the last decade. Their niche and strength is annuities. This segment is
growing in absolute terms but is losing share relative to 401(k)s, IRAs and the retirement
market in general. Insurance companies should be wary of inroads here associated with
delivery system weaknesses or excessive fees. At the same time, they must look for
opportunities for expansion in the IRA and 401(k) markets. Opportunity may come via
traditional routes, such as the rollover market, or by creative avenues, such as product
innovation. If they are unsuccessful or choose to ignore these areas, insurance companies
risk becoming bit players in the retirement market. They are not likely to show a
disastrous loss in market share akin to that experienced by depository institutions in the
IRA market, but attention should be directed to shoring up their annuity strength and
diversifying to guard against the inefficacy of these measures. They should ask
themselves a fundamental question; Do they want to link their survival solely to the
annuities market?
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Modified Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Assets
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Figure 18
Life Insurance Retirement Annuities
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*The 1996 figures are not directly comparable to previous years due a change in treatment of
separate account annuities.37
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* Unusually large increase in annuity premiums in 1986 was due to an NAIC-mandated change in
statutory reporting methods.
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